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INTRODUCTION 
n November 2012, more than fifty-five percent of Colorado voters 
passed Amendment 64, a voter initiative titled, “An Act to Regulate 
Marijuana Like Alcohol.”1 The measure removed Colorado’s criminal 
penalties for possession of less than one ounce of marijuana and 
	
 Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program, University of 
Denver, Sturm College of Law. I thank the editors of the Oregon Law Review for allowing 
me to participate in this discussion. The views expressed herein are my own and do not 
represent the opinions of the University of Denver, the Office of the Governor, or the 
Amendment 64 Task Force. 
1 E.g., Ballot Measure: Colorado (Colorado Amendment 64), CNN POLITICS (Dec. 10, 
2012, 10:22 AM), http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/state/CO/ballot/01; 
Amendment 64: The Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act of 2012, CAMPAIGN TO 
REGULATE MARIJUANA LIKE ALCOHOL, http://www.regulatemarijuana.org/s/regulate       
-marijuana-alcohol-act-2012 (last visited May 28, 2013). 
I
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permitted individuals to cultivate up to six marijuana plants and to 
give away without remuneration amounts up to one ounce.2 More 
significantly, Amendment 64 called on the legislature to enact 
appropriate legislation to authorize and regulate the retail sale of 
marijuana by January 1, 2014.3 A similar measure was passed by 
nearly the same margin simultaneously in the state of Washington.4 
While eighteen states plus the District of Columbia had previously 
enacted measures permitting marijuana to be used for medical 
purposes,5 the measures in Colorado and Washington were the first to 
embrace full legalization of small amounts of the drug and to call for 
the regulation of a for-profit recreational marijuana industry. Their 
passage made national headlines in large part because marijuana 
remains a Schedule I narcotic—a drug whose manufacture, 
possession, and sale remain serious felonies under federal law.6 The 
Obama Justice Department had strongly opposed an earlier, 
unsuccessful legalization effort in California,7 and the passage of 
Amendment 64 and Proposition 502 in Washington State only 
sharpened the conflict between the states’ experimentation with 
marijuana decriminalization and the federal government’s continuing 
prohibition of the drug. 
In part because of concerns about a showdown with the federal 
government over marijuana policy, Colorado Governor John 
	
2 COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16(3). 
3 Id. § 16(5)(h)–(i). 
4 E.g., Ballot Measure: Washington (Washington Initiative 502), CNN POLITICS (Dec. 
10, 2012, 11:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/state/WA/ballot/02; 
Initiative Measure No. 502, SECRETARY OF ST., http://sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections 
/initiatives/i502.pdf (last visited May 28, 2013). 
5 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.37.010 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. & 3d Special 
Legis. Sess.); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2012); COLO CONST. art. 
18, § 14; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 329-121 to -128 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Legis. 
Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-B (West, Westlaw through 2011 2d Reg. 
Legis. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.26421–.26430 (West, Westlaw through 
2012 Reg. Legis. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-46-101 to -344 (West, Westlaw 
through 2011 legislation); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 453A.010–.810 (West, Westlaw 
through 2011 Reg. Legis. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 
legislation); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-2B-1 to -7 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. 
Legis. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.300–.375 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 21-28.6-
1 to -13 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Legis. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 
4472–41 (West, Westlaw through 2011-2012 Legis. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
69.51A.005–.903 (West, Westlaw through 2012 legislation). 
6 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–889 (2006). 
7 See, e.g., John Hoeffel, Holder Vows Fight Over Prop. 19, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 16, 
2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/16/local/la-me-marijuana-holder-20101016. 
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Hickenlooper publicly opposed passage of Amendment 64.8 After the 
election, however, he moved quickly to implement the bill’s 
provisions.9 Given the very short timeline set forth in the Amendment 
for the implementation of a regulatory regime,10 time was clearly of 
the essence. On December 10, 2012, the Governor appointed a 
twenty-four-member Task Force to make recommendations to the 
General Assembly regarding the implementation of the 
Amendment.11 The makeup of the Task Force was designed to 
include the many diverse stakeholders in the marijuana legalization 
process.12 It included state elected officials, regulators from the 
Colorado Department of Revenue, representatives of the medical 
marijuana industry, marijuana consumers, organized labor, 
employers, local government, law enforcement, public health, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys, among others.13 I was asked to 
serve on the Task Force because of my interest and expertise in the 
federalism implications of state marijuana regulation.14 
The Task Force was quickly broken up into a number of Working 
Groups, each containing both members of the Task Force and other 
stakeholders with expertise in the various specific topics assigned to 
the Working Groups—criminal law, regulatory framework, consumer 
safety and social issues, local authority and control, and tax and 
	
8 Gov. Hickenlooper Opposes Amendment 64, COLO. (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www 
.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?c=Page&childpagename=GovHickenlooper%2FCBONLayout&
cid=1251630730489&pagename=CBONWrapper. 
9 Gov. Hickenlooper Signs Amendment 64 Proclamation, Creates Task Force to 
Recommend Needed Legislative Actions, COLO. (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.colorado.gov 
/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable 
=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251842728832&ssbinary=true [hereinafter Amendment 64 
Proclamation]. 
10 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16(5)(a) (“Not later than July 1, 2013, the 
Department shall adopt regulations necessary for the implementation of this section.”); id. 
§ 16(5)(g)(I) (“Each application for an annual license to operate a marijuana establishment 
shall be submitted to the department. The Department shall begin accepting and processing 
applications on October 1, 2013.”). 
11 Amendment 64 Proclamation, supra note 9. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 I have been writing and researching in this area for several years. See, e.g., Sam 
Kamin and Eli Wald, Medical Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 OR. L. 
REV. 869 (2013); Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of 
Marijuana Regulation in the United States, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147 (2012); Sam 
Kamin, Marijuana at the Crossroads: Keynote Address, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 977 (2012); 
Sam Kamin, The Challenges of Marijuana Law Reform, in THE IMPACT OF THE 
DECRIMINALIZATION AND LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA (2011). 
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finance.15 The Working Groups were asked to propose 
recommendations to the full Task Force for consideration. I was 
assigned to serve on the Regulatory Framework Working Group, 
which was charged with creating an overall structure for the 
regulation of recreational marijuana and with coordinating the 
recommendations coming from the other Working Groups.16 
I 
THE CHALLENGES FACING THE TASK FORCE 
Our task was a difficult one. Beyond the obvious problems with 
trying to develop consensus among a twenty-four-member body—
many of whom had been on opposing sides at the ballot box just 
months earlier—Colorado is attempting to do what has not previously 
been attempted anywhere in the United States and possibly in the 
world.17 While many states and even some national governments 
have experimented with drug decriminalization, Colorado is the first 
jurisdiction attempting not merely to legalize possession of small 
amounts of marijuana but to construct a regulatory and tax regime for 
its manufacture and sale. 
Furthermore, a lot of money is at stake. Medical marijuana sales in 
Colorado amounted to nearly $200 million in 2012, generating $5.5 
million in sales tax.18 Moreover, sales were made only to the roughly 
100,000 registered medical marijuana patients in the state.19 When 
sales to Colorado’s several million adults (none of whom will be 
required to register with the state as marijuana users) become lawful 
in early 2014, it is logical to expect the size of the industry to grow by 
at least an order of magnitude. 
	
15 See JACK FINLAW & BARBARA BROHL, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDMENT 64, 12 (2013) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT], 
available at http://www.colorado.gov/cms/forms/dor-tax/A64TaskForceFinalReport.pdf. 
16 Id. at 12, 124. 
17 While a number of American and foreign jurisdictions have experimented with the 
decriminalization, medicalization, or partial legalization of marijuana, I have been unable 
to come up with another example of any government choosing to legalize, regulate, and 
tax marijuana as Colorado and Washington have. 
18 Colorado Medical Marijuana Dispensary Retail Sales and State Sales Tax by County 
FY2012, COLO., http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=appli 
cation%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251832728888&ss 
binary=true (last visited May 28, 2013). 
19 Medical Marijuana Statistics, COLO., http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/CDPHE  
-CHEIS/CBON/1251593017044 (last visited May 28, 2013). 
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But Colorado’s task is complicated by much more than novelty and 
the promise of untold riches. A more serious concern is the fact that 
marijuana remains a prohibited substance under federal law. Although 
the federal government’s enforcement of the marijuana prohibition 
has been uneven at best,20 it remains an ongoing threat. In fact, 
federal law provides for significant criminal penalties for those who 
knowingly facilitate a violation of the Controlled Substances Act.21 
As I stated somewhat facetiously at the first meeting of the Task 
Force, a colorable argument could be made that the entire work of the 
Task Force was to facilitate violations of federal law and that all of us 
participating in this endeavor were subject to arrest and prosecution. 
There are several ways that federal disapproval of state legalization 
could manifest. The federal government could simply begin arresting 
Colorado residents engaged in violations of the CSA and/or 
subjecting their assets to forfeiture;22 it could file suit to enjoin the 
	
20 Compare Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Selected U.S. Attorneys on Investigations and Prosecutions in States 
Authorizing the Med. Use of Marijuana 2 (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice 
.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf (“As a general matter, pursuit of 
[Departmental] priorities should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals 
whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing 
for the medical use of marijuana. For example, prosecution of individuals with cancer or 
other serious illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment regimen 
consistent with applicable state law, or those caregivers in clear and unambiguous 
compliance with existing state law who provide such individuals with marijuana, is 
unlikely to be an efficient use of limited federal resources.”), with Memorandum from 
James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to U.S. Attorneys on 
Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for 
Med. Use 2 (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter Cole Memo], available at http://www 
.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf (“The Ogden 
Memorandum was never intended to shield such activities from federal enforcement action 
and prosecution, even where those activities purport to comply with state law. Persons 
who are in the business of cultivating, selling, or distributing marijuana, and those who 
knowingly facilitate such activities, are in violation of the [CSA], regardless of state law. 
Consistent with resource constraints and the discretion you may exercise in your district, 
such persons are subject to federal enforcement action, including potential prosecution. 
State laws or local ordinances are not a defense to civil . . . enforcement of federal law 
with respect to such conduct, including enforcement of the CSA.”). 
21 See, e.g., Cole Memo, supra note 20, at 2 (“Persons who are in the business of 
cultivating, selling, or distributing marijuana, and those who knowingly facilitate such 
activities, are in violation of the Controlled Substances Act, regardless of state law.” 
(emphasis added)). 
22 The federal government cannot commandeer state and local law enforcement 
officials to enforce federal laws. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
However, the federal government remains free to enforce federal marijuana law 
throughout the land, regardless of state and local laws to the contrary. See, e.g., Gonzales 
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development and implementation of the regulatory apparatus;23 it 
could threaten to withhold certain funds from Colorado and 
Washington State until such time as they put aside their plans to tax 
and regulate marijuana.24 Upon the passage of Amendment 64, 
Governor Hickenlooper appealed to the federal government to 
provide guidance regarding its enforcement intentions if Colorado 
were to implement Amendment 64; no answer was forthcoming.25 
Without such guidance, the Task Force was essentially flying blind, 
unable to tailor its recommendations in light of federal enforcement 
intentions. While word trickled out of closed-door meetings that the 
federal government was concerned primarily about the diversion of 
adult-use marijuana,26 we were reduced to little more than reading tea 
leaves. 
Thus, our task became to balance two competing interests, only 
one of which we could fully understand. On one hand, the governor 
charged us to make recommendations to the General Assembly that 
would give effect to the will of the people as expressed through their 
passage of Amendment 64. On the other, we sought to forestall 
possible federal enforcement action that would destroy the possibility 
	
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (upholding under the commerce power Congress’s ability to 
prohibit marijuana in the states); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Collective, 
532 U.S. 483, 494–95 (2001) (rejecting the argument that a defendant acting pursuant to a 
state medical marijuana provision has a defense to the federal marijuana prohibition). 
23 For example, the government could bring a suit similar to the largely successful suit 
brought against the state of Arizona to enjoin the enforcement of SB 1070, the 
controversial Arizona immigration provision. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492, 2503 (2012). However, it is also worth noting that nothing can be done to overturn 
Colorado’s repeal of its criminal prohibition on possession of small amounts of marijuana. 
The federal government cannot commandeer the state legislature any more than it can the 
state law enforcement apparatus. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 
(1992) (finding that Congress lacks the power under the Commerce Clause to compel the 
states to pass particular legislation). 
24 Of course, the power of the federal government to achieve through the spending 
power that which it cannot through other provisions of the constitution remains in doubt 
after the Affordable Care Act litigation. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566, 2603–04 (2012) (invalidating as impermissibly coercive Congress’s attempt to 
expand Medicaid through the use of the Spending Power). 
25 See, e.g., John Ingold et al., Hickenlooper Reaching Out to Feds on Colorado 
Marijuana Legalization, DENVERPOST.COM (Nov. 7, 2012, 11:13 PM), http://www.denver 
post.com/breakingnews/ci_21949542/hickenlooper-reaching-out-feds-colorado-marijuana 
-legalization. 
26 See, e.g., Bob Young, Inslee Encouraged by Marijuana Talk with Attorney General 
Holder, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 22, 2013, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020190 
301_insleeholderpotxml.html; Jim Camden, Pot Leaving Washington Is Federal Concern, 
THE SPOKESMAN-REV., Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2013/jan/25 
/pot-leaving-washington-is-federal-concern/. 
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of Amendment 64 being implemented at all. These two often 
competing goals drove nearly every decision we made. 
II 
THE WORK OF THE TASK FORCE AND THE WORKING GROUPS 
One thing that became clear very early in the process was that the 
task before us was massive. Our charge covered everything from 
advertising to product labeling, from product testing to local zoning, 
from taxation to education and public health. Our recommendations 
covered most of these topics,27 hopefully creating a framework from 
which the Legislature and the Department of Revenue can develop a 
complete set of regulations. My goal here, however, is not to survey 
these recommendations in their entirety but rather to highlight a few 
illustrative examples that demonstrate the challenges faced by the 
Task Force. I hope that others can learn from our endeavors. 
A. Balancing State and Federal Concerns 
The two competing factors I describe above manifested, for 
example, in our consideration of the so-called “marijuana tourism” 
issue. Some argued that the language of Amendment 64 clearly 
implied, though it did not require, that in-state and out-of-state 
residents be treated identically with regard to retail sales. Amendment 
64 repealed the ban on possession of small amounts of marijuana for 
everyone, whether resident or not; if out-of-staters were allowed to 
possess marijuana within the state, then surely they ought to be 
allowed to purchase it.28 Yet others argued that permitting sales to out 
of state residents was exactly the sort of red flag that would awake the 
sleeping giant of federal law enforcement. 
Cutting the baby in half, we developed widespread consensus for a 
compromise position allowing sales to be made to out-of-state 
	
27 Sometimes, though, we found a problem to be intractable. For example, we were 
unable to suggest a solution to the banking problem facing the marijuana industry. See 
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 98 (Recommendation 15.1). With regard to the 
unwillingness of banks to deal in the proceeds of marijuana transactions for fear of federal 
money-laundering charges, we were able to do little more than recommend “that the 
General Assembly consider all lawful alternatives to assist marijuana businesses to access 
the banking system.” Id. at 163. 
28 Many, myself included, argued that if out-of-staters were not allowed to purchase the 
marijuana which they were lawfully entitled to possess from a retail store, a black market 
would quickly develop to serve them. Amendment 64 was clearly designed to move 
marijuana out of the black market and into a regulated, and taxed, legal market. 
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residents, but encouraging the State Assembly to enact limits on the 
amount of marijuana that could be sold to those from out-of-state.29 It 
was the belief both of the Working Group and the Task Force that 
reasonable limits on the amount an out-of-stater could buy at one 
time—we toyed with one-eighth of an ounce but ultimately decided 
against recommending a particular amount—would make 
prohibitively difficult the accumulation of an amount of marijuana 
worth smuggling out of state. 
Our intent to balance state and federal concerns made us more 
cautious on the question of out-of-state investment in Colorado 
marijuana businesses, however. Under the medical marijuana 
regulations already in place in our state when Amendment 64 was 
passed in 2012, only those who have been Colorado residents for at 
least two years are entitled to apply for a medical-marijuana license.30 
We determined that concerns about federal objections were sufficient 
to recommend carrying that ban over into the adult-use marijuana 
realm.31 In many ways, this decision demonstrated the “through the 
looking glass” nature of regulating marijuana in the face of the 
continuing federal prohibition. Normally, it would be constitutionally 
suspect to treat residents and non-residents differently with regard to 
the provision of a public benefit; there is concern that such laws 
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment 
by discriminating against out-of-state residents.32 However, when that 
government “benefit” is a license to violate federal law, the situation 
is quite different. It is hard to imagine a federal court being 
sympathetic to an out-of-state plaintiff’s claims that Colorado was 
denying her the same opportunity to engage in serious felonious 
conduct that it affords its own citizens. In fact, we believed that 
permitting capital to flow into the marijuana industry from out of 
state—and permitting marijuana proceeds to flow out—would be seen 
by the federal government as more problematic than prohibiting out-
of-state residents to own a licensed marijuana facility in our state. 
	
29 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 49 (Recommendation 7.1). 
30 COLO. REV. ST. ANN. 12-43.3-307(1)(m) (West, Westlaw through 2011 legislation). 
31 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 33 (Recommendation 4.1). 
32 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506–07 (1999) (invalidating, under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, California’s attempt to 
limit newly arrived residents to the AFDC benefits they would have been entitled to in 
their last place of residence.). 
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B. Taxation 
Other issues touched on federalism only peripherally. For example, 
establishing an appropriate level of taxation proved particularly 
vexing for reasons having much more to do with public policy and the 
arcana of Colorado law than any questions of the appropriate division 
of power between state and federal governments. By its terms, 
Amendment 64 required the legislature to enact an excise tax of at 
most fifteen percent with the money earmarked to pay for school 
construction.33 While this promise of tax revenue was certainly one of 
the more attractive aspects of the amendment for some voters, that 
promise may prove more illusory than it appeared on the ballot. 
Simply put, the people cannot, even through the initiative process, 
force their elected representatives to do anything. While the 
Amendment says that the legislature shall enact an excise tax, that is a 
command without an enforcement mechanism. Furthermore, under 
Colorado law, any new tax increase must be approved by the voters.34 
Thus, by approving Amendment 64, the public truly did little more 
than ask the legislature to ask the voters to approve a particular tax.35 
The Task Force also considered the imposition of a separate 
statewide sales tax on marijuana. Although the Amendment mentions 
only the excise tax, we took it as a given that this express provision 
did not preclude the imposition of other taxes. Given that the cost of 
regulation is sure to be high, many argued that these costs should be 
offset by heavy sales taxes. The counterweight to this argument was 
twofold. Proponents of the Amendment argued that high taxes would 
contravene the underlying premise of Amendment 64—to treat 
marijuana more like alcohol than like an illicit substance.36 Second, 
there was significant concern that a high tax on regulated marijuana 
would create a black market. While the public is probably willing to 
pay a premium for legal marijuana, this argument went, there are 
	
33 COLO CONST. art. 18, § 16(5)(d). 
34 COLO CONST. art. 10, § 20. 
35 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 28 (discussing Recommendation 3.1, 
which includes the Task Force’s finding that the passage of Amendment 64 was not the 
approval by the voters of a tax increase and that an additional public vote would be needed 
to comply with the requirements of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights (Tabor)). 
36 The excise tax rates on alcohol in Colorado are quite low. For example, in 2010, the 
tax per gallon of spirits, wine, and beer were $2.28, $0.28, and $0.08, respectively. TAX 
FOUND., STATE SALES, GASOLINE, CIGARETTE, AND ALCOHOL TAXES (2010), available 
at http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/state_various_sales_rates 
_2000-2010.pdf. 
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limits to how high that premium can go. At a certain point, the price 
of regulated and taxed marijuana would become high enough to lure 
buyers into purchasing on the black market. In the end, we were 
unable to arrive at consensus on this point, encouraging the legislature 
to take testimony regarding the appropriate level, if any, of a 
statewide sales tax on marijuana.37 Hopefully, though, our discussion 
of the issues and the input we got from members of the public were 
enough to give the State Assembly a good start on its consideration of 
this issue.38 
C. Regulatory Framework 
One of the most important and telling decisions for the regulatory 
working group was determining the overall shape of the regulatory 
framework for the manufacture and sale of recreational—or adult 
use—marijuana.39 Although the Amendment’s title, “Regulate 
Marijuana Like Alcohol,” might seem like a fairly clear exhortation 
on this point, we in fact chose a very different model for the 
regulatory regime for the new industry. Rather than regulating 
marijuana like alcohol, we chose to borrow heavily from the already 
extant medical marijuana regulations present in Colorado prior to the 
passage of Amendment 64.40 
	
37 It should be noted that Washington’s Initiative 502 called for a twenty-five percent 
excise tax on every level of marijuana transfer—from producer to processor, from 
processor to retailer, and from retailer to consumer. See Initiative Measure No. 502, 
SECRETARY OF ST., 40 (July 8, 2011), http://sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/initiatives/i502 
.pdf. 
38 In this regard, it is worth noting that the co-chairs of the joint committee empanelled 
by the General Assembly to take on the Task Force’s recommendations—Representative 
Dan Pabon and Senator Cheri Jahn—were both members of the Task Force. See Dennis 
Huspeni, Marijuana Joint Committee Created in Colorado Legislature, DENV. BUS. J. 
(Mar. 8, 2013, 1:47 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2013/03/08/marijuana 
-joint-committee-created-in.html?page=all. 
39 As I noted in a previous Article, advocates for marijuana law reform prefer the 
phrase “adult use” to “recreational use.” I have tried to use “adult use” throughout. See 
Sam Kamin and Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 OR. L. REV. 
869, 878 n.35 (2013). 
40 See generally Colo. Med. Marijuana Enforcement Div. Rules 1.001-19.100 (2011) 
[hereinafter MMED Rules], available at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol 
=urldata&blobheadername1=Content-Disposition&blobheadername2=Content-Type&blob 
headervalue1=inline%3B+filename%3D%22Current+Set+of+Rules%2C+Effective+July 
+1%2C+2011.pdf%22&blobheadervalue2=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable 
=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251781468397&ssbinary=true. 
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1. Borrowing from Colorado’s Medical Marijuana Framework 
In this regard, we were fortunate that Colorado had more than two 
years’ experience running a regime for the manufacture, sale, etc. of 
marijuana for medical patients.41 I have detailed these regulations 
elsewhere,42 but stated briefly, Colorado has the most extensive 
regulatory apparatus of any of the eighteen medical marijuana states 
in the country. Under Colorado law, a patient with a doctor’s 
recommendation is entitled to possess up to two ounces of marijuana 
and may purchase that medicine from a business licensed by the state 
to sell it.43 To obtain a license from the Department of Revenue to 
grow marijuana, make marijuana-infused products, or sell either 
marijuana or infused products, an applicant is subject to a criminal 
background check and must demonstrate proof of Colorado 
residency.44 
Perhaps more crucially, our system calls for a closed-loop 
production and distribution apparatus under which the provenance of 
each plant must be carefully documented and all marijuana produced 
must be carefully measured and accounted for.45 Often referred to as 
seed-to-sale surveillance, the tracking of product in Colorado closely 
parallels the way pharmaceuticals are tracked—only authorized 
employees are allowed into certain areas of licensed facilities,46 video 
surveillance is mandated throughout licensed premises,47 and 
extensive records and shipment manifests are required to be kept and 
presented to officials of the Department of Revenue.48 
Together, these various regulations were effective in keeping the 
federal government from cracking down against Colorado’s 
marijuana patients and providers despite their clear violation of the 
CSA. Unlike other states where tensions between federal law and 
state medical marijuana provisions led to arrests, threatening letters 
	
41 See John Ingold, New Med-Marijuana Regs Now Law in Colorado, 
DENVERPOST.COM (June 7, 2010, 1:21 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/marijuana 
/ci_15244688. 
42 See, e.g., Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana 
Regulation in the United States, 47 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147 (2012); Sam Kamin, 
Marijuana at the Crossroads: Keynote Address, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 977 (2012). 
43 COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 14. 
44 COLO. REV. ST. ANN. § 12-43.3-307 (West, Westlaw through 2011 legislation). 
45 See MMED Rules, supra note 40, Rules 10.100-11.200. 
46 Id. Rule 10.100. 
47 Id. Rule 10.400. 
48 Id. Rule 11.200. 
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from the DEA and the shutdown of large parts of the industry,49 
Colorado’s experiment with medical marijuana was left largely 
undisturbed by federal law enforcement officials.50 Thus, the 
Colorado provisions have stood as something of a model for other 
states considering implementing medical marijuana regulations. We 
quite sensibly chose them as a model for our own adult-use marijuana 
regulations. 
We began by recommending to the legislature that the Medical 
Marijuana Enforcement Division be converted to the Marijuana 
Enforcement Division with authority over both medical and adult use 
marijuana,51 that anyone seeking an ownership interest in a licensed 
adult use marijuana business demonstrate two years residency in 
Colorado,52 and that prospective owners meet eligibility criteria—
including a criminal background check—similar to those required for 
medical marijuana licensees.53 
2. Vertical Integration Requirement 
But deciding that we would be regulating marijuana like medical 
marijuana—rather than like alcohol—was merely the first, rather than 
the last, regulatory decision before us. A crucial question was exactly 
how much of the medical marijuana regulatory regime we would take 
with us into the regulation of adult use marijuana. In particular, we 
considered whether the vertical integration requirement put in place 
for the regulation of medical marijuana should be applied to adult use 
as well. 
	
49 See Jennifer Medina, U.S. Attorneys in California Set Crackdown on Marijuana, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/08/us/california-to-crack        
-down-on-medical-marijuana.html; Jamie Kelly, Former Grizzly Pleads Not Guilty to 
Federal Drug Charges, MISSOULIAN (Jan. 19, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://missoulian.com 
/news/state-and-regional/former-grizzly-pleads-not-guilty-to-federal-drug-charges/article 
_5166136a-4304-11e1-a886-0019bb2963f4.html#ixzz1k1FXdfT4. 
50 The principal exception to the immunization of Colorado medical marijuana 
practitioners to crackdowns taking place elsewhere was the issuance of letters to Colorado 
dispensaries operating within 1000 feet of a school zone. See, e.g., John Ingold, Colorado 
Medical-Pot Dispensaries to Get Letters from Feds Saying They’re Too Close to Schools, 
DENVERPOST.COM (Jan. 13, 2012, 6:40 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/marijuana 
/ci_19733017. Yet even these letters demonstrate federal acquiescence to the Colorado 
medical marijuana regulatory system. Those receiving letters were in clear violation of 
federal law, but the DEA asked them to move their business to different locations rather 
than seeking to make arrests or forfeit property. 
51 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 22 (Recommendation 1.4). 
52 Id. at 33 (Recommendation 4.1). 
53 Id. at 34 (Recommendation 4.2). 
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One of the more esoteric but important aspects of medical 
marijuana regulation is the so-called seventy-thirty rule, which 
requires producers of marijuana to retail seventy percent of what they 
produce themselves.54 This partial vertical integration requirement 
was designed to limit the size and growth of the industry and to 
prevent diversion of marijuana to the illicit market; the coupling of 
production and retail was designed to make inventory easier to track 
and to prevent the excess production of marijuana. However, the 
requirement clearly operates as a restraint on consumer choice. To see 
why, imagine a similar requirement in the context of beer or liquor. 
With vertical integration, seventy percent of the beer sold in any 
particular liquor store would have to be brewed by the owner of the 
liquor store; only thirty percent of the beer could be brewed by others. 
Such a system is cumbersome, difficult to comply with, and limits 
consumer choice. 
Yet there was much support, both at the Working Group and Task 
Force stages, for retaining the vertical integration requirement in the 
adult-use regulations. This support came not just from those 
benefiting from the vertical integration requirement—those, in other 
words, already operating a vertically-integrated marijuana business. 
Rather, support for vertical integration was publicly voiced by 
members of law enforcement, prosecutors, regulators, and members 
of the public health community. 
Part of the reason for this widespread support was an inherent 
conservatism; Colorado’s extensive regulatory regime has been 
remarkably successful at keeping federal enforcement to a minimum 
and no one wanted to do anything that might be perceived as risking 
that tenuous relationship. Although many, myself included, argued 
that the seed-to-sale surveillance, criminal background checks, and 
other factors contributed far more than vertical integration to 
Colorado’s insulation from federal enforcement, the majority of those, 
both on the Working Group and the Task Force, decided that it was 
more prudent to import the regulatory system as is.55 
	
54 See COLO. REV. ST. ANN. 12-43.3-103(b) (West, Westlaw through 2011 legislation) 
(“On or before September 1, 2010, a [retail] business or operation shall certify that it is 
cultivating at least seventy percent of the medical marijuana necessary for its operation.”). 
55 We proposed sun-setting this recommendation after three years of operation. That is, 
we suggested that the legislature return to the vertical integration requirement after three 
years to see if it was serving the goals that we had set for it. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra 
note 15, at 16 (Recommendation 1.1). 
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It should be noted as well that there is nothing inherent in the 
regulation of vice that requires vertical integration. For example, 
Colorado, like most states, has imposed a three-tier system for alcohol 
regulation that forbids vertical integration56: 
 After Prohibition was repealed, most states instituted the three-
tier system for the regulation of alcohol and, seventy-five years 
later, it remains the most popular regulatory model. Tier One 
consists of alcohol producers—wineries, distilleries, and 
breweries. Tier Two is the wholesaler level: after receiving alcohol 
from the producer, the wholesaler pays excise taxes to the state, and 
then distributes the alcohol to instate retailers. Tier Three is made 
up of retail outlets licensed by the state. Unless otherwise provided 
by the state, Tier Three is the only level permitted to sell directly to 
a consumer. Vertical integration of the tiers (common ownership of 
businesses in multiple tiers) is prohibited.57 
Furthermore, the State of Washington, in adopting Initiative 502, 
explicitly rejected the vertical integration requirement in favor of a 
model much more closely resembling the alcohol model. Its statute 
explicitly prohibits exactly what ours requires; namely, the joint 
ownership of production and retail licenses.58 Still other regulatory 
possibilities exist. For example, many states, rather than adopting a 
three-tiered system for alcohol, use a model under which the state 
takes a more active role in the distribution of alcohol.59 The Task 
Force considered but ultimately rejected such a state-run model for 
marijuana distribution60 as well as a more flexible model that would 
	
56 COLO. REV. ST. ANN. § 12-47-101 et seq. (West, Westlaw through 2011 legislation). 
57 Kevin C. Quigley, Uncorking Granholm: Extending the Nondiscrimination Principle 
to All Interstate Commerce in Wine, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1871, 1882 (2011) (footnotes 
omitted). 
58 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.328 (West, Westlaw through 2013 legislation) 
(“Neither a licensed marijuana producer nor a licensed marijuana processor shall have a 
direct or indirect financial interest in a licensed marijuana retailer.”). 
59 See, e.g., The Control States, NAT’L ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL ASS’N, 
http://www.nabca.org/States/States.aspx (last visited May 28, 2013) (listing the 18 states 
that take an active role in the distribution of alcohol). 
60 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 19 (Recommendation 1.2). Although the 
Task Force and Working Group were presented with testimony indicating that state-run 
alcohol stores were associated with fewer negative externalities than privately-run stores, 
we rejected the adoption of a state-run marijuana model for two reasons. First, it appeared 
clear to us that such a model was inconsistent with the text of Amendment 64, which 
clearly envisioned the state as a regulator rather than a market participant. Second, there 
was concern that the state taking an active role in the distribution of marijuana—a federal 
offense—would increase rather than allay federal concern. It is one thing for the state to 
permit and even to benefit through taxation from the production of a Schedule I narcotic. It 
is quite another for a state to direct its officials to violate federal law in their official 
capacities. 
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have neither permitted nor forbidden vertical integration. Instead, we 
adopted in whole the regulatory regime that had been in place in 
Colorado to regulate medical marijuana. 
3. Limiting New Licenses to Existing Licensees 
Yet we did not stop at conveying the medical marijuana model and 
its vertical integration requirement into the adult-use realm. We went 
a step further and suggested to the General Assembly that the same 
actors be transferred from the adult-use regime as well. That is, part 
of our recommendation was that for the first year of adult-use 
regulation, only those currently holding medical marijuana licenses 
should be permitted to apply for adult-use licenses.61 Not only did we 
carry over a system that would be of significant benefit to those 
already in the medical marijuana market—because they had both 
retail space and growing facilities already in operation—we 
essentially closed the market to new participants; only those already 
in the market as of December 31, 2012, would be able to enter the 
adult use market in the first year. We essentially guaranteed a 
windfall to those who were daring, smart, or lucky enough to have 
entered the market early. 
This happened for a number of reasons, but the primary one was a 
surprise. The impetus for providing this benefit to existing licensees 
came not, as one might expect, from the license-holders themselves, 
but from the regulators charged with implementing adult-use 
marijuana regulation. The Department of Revenue’s Marijuana 
Enforcement Division was anxious to see a regulatory regime put in 
place that it knew it could execute. Working with those already 
known to the Department—and who had demonstrated their 
willingness and capacity to comply with the Department’s rules—was 
clearly an important concern of the regulators. 
These concerns were certainly well founded. The Marijuana 
Enforcement Division had suffered layoffs and budget shortfalls 
	
61 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 16 (recommending that the General 
Assembly “[p]rovide for a grace period of one (1) year that would limit new applications 
for adult-use marijuana licenses to medical marijuana license holders in good standing, or 
applicants that had an application pending with the Medical Marijuana Enforcement 
Division prior to December 10, 2012” (Recommendation 1.1)). We also suggested that an 
existing medical marijuana licensee be permitted to designate some part of their inventory 
from their medical license to their new recreational license. See id. at 36–45. 
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during its two years of operation62 and a report critical of its 
management and oversight was released shortly after the Task Force 
completed its work.63 The division was hamstrung by delays in 
criminal background checks carried out by the Colorado Bureau of 
Investigations—which sometimes required more than six months to 
complete the checks—and was clearly concerned that if it had to 
evaluate scores of applications from new potential licensees it would 
be unable to meet the requirements of the new law. 
Thus, though it is tempting to see this episode as an example of 
regulatory capture,64 that explanation is too simple. The 
grandfathering in of existing licensees is better thought of as the 
alignment of interest between the regulator and the regulated rather 
than the classic case of capture, in which the regulator simply serves 
the regulated rather than the public interest. 
III 
THE ROAD AHEAD 
A poll released by the Pew Research Center on April 4, 2013 
showed that public support for marijuana legalization in the United 
States had reached an all-time high of fifty-two percent.65 More 
striking, views on the subject varied significantly with age. Sixty-five 
percent of Millennials—those born since 1980—supported 
legalization, compared with only fifty percent of Baby Boomers and 
thirty-two percent of the so-called Greatest Generation.66 The parallel 
to support for gay marriage is hard to avoid. Both issues now enjoy 
unprecedented support, particularly among younger respondents.67 
	
62 Kristen Wyatt, Pot Regulators Slashed in Colorado, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 3, 
2012, available at http://www.denverpost.com/henderson/ci_20316774. 
63 Keith Coffman, Colorado Medical Marijuana System Lacks Oversight, Plagued by 
Money Woes: Report, REUTERS, Mar. 26, 2013, available at http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2013/03/27/refile-colorado-medical-p_n_2959862.html. 
64 See, e.g., Lawrence G. Baxter, Capture Nuances in Financial Regulation, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 537, 541 (2012) (defining capture as “the heavily disproportionate 
influence by one of the interest groups covered by a regulatory framework to the improper 
disadvantage, or exclusion, of other groups also intended to be embraced, restricted or 
protected by the regulatory regime” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
65 Majority Now Supports Legalizing Marijuana, PEW CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND 
THE PRESS (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/04/majority-now              
-supports-legalizing-marijuana/. 
66 Id. 
67 Growing Support for Gay Marriage: Changed Minds and Changing Demographics, 
PEW CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.people            
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Gay marriage is supported forty-nine percent compared to forty-four 
percent opposed, with support among Millenials at seventy percent.68 
Epochal change on both issues is beginning to seem inevitable. In 
the context of medical marijuana, this will mean that the federal 
government and the states will need to formulate a system for the 
taxing and regulation of a substance that federal law has treated as an 
unalloyed evil since the 1930s. The continuing federal prohibition can 
be criticized at multiple levels—it seems inconsistent with the 
medical potential of marijuana, it disproportionally impacts 
communities of color, it expends large amounts of law enforcement, 
judicial, and correctional resources on non-violent offenders—but 
perhaps one of the least-voiced criticisms is the extent to which 
federal prohibition hampers state-level law reform. If marijuana were 
not prohibited federally, states might experiment with different 
models. Some states might ban it outright. Others might regulate its 
production and sale while taking tax revenue. Still others might 
encourage its production the way Nevada has encouraged the gaming 
industry. 
This laboratory of ideas would allow us to determine how best to 
deal with marijuana. Currently, however, only two states—
Washington and Colorado—have taken on the federal prohibition and 
decided to tax and regulate marijuana the way other products—
alcohol, cigarettes, etc.—are regulated. We know there will be 
significant differences in the regulatory approaches these two states 
will take with regard to taxation, vertical integration, and so on.  
Hopefully, the work being done in these two states will be an early 
contribution to this process. 
  
	
-press.org/2013/03/20/growing-support-for-gay-marriage-changed-minds-and-changing       
-demographics/. 
68 Id. 
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